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RATING THE COMPETITION AGENCIES:  
WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD PERFORMANCE? 
William E. Kovacic* 
INTRODUCTION 
What is a good competition agency? Among competition policy spe-
cialists, this topic often emerges in casual conversation and scholarly de-
bate. For all the attention the subject receives, discussions about agency 
quality rarely focus carefully on what constitutes good performance. In 
sport, we use clear, generally accepted scoring rules to determine which 
side is ahead in an individual contest and to sort out good teams from the 
bad. The field of competition policy lacks such standards, yet the absence 
of well-defined, generally accepted scoring rules does not inhibit commen-
tators from providing confident assessments of how well specific competi-
tion agencies are doing their jobs.  
The quality of performance by the Department of Justice Antitrust Di-
vision (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “the Com-
mission”) attracted much attention within the U.S. competition policy 
community during the run up to the 2008 national elections and in the 
months before Barack Obama’s inauguration as president. Assessments of 
the DOJ and the FTC figured prominently in the popular press, academic 
papers, and in the comments of the victorious candidate for the presidency. 
Academics, journalists, practitioners, and candidates generally have 
portrayed the Bush administration competition agencies in gloomy terms. 
Speaking at a conference in June 2008, Professor Robert Pitofsky observed 
that “over the last decade, there have been some awfully lean years for anti-
trust enforcement. It hasn’t been asleep but it’s been dozing in my view.” In 
his book published later the same year, Pitofsky said incumbent DOJ and 
FTC leaders were given to “extreme interpretations and misinterpretations 
of conservative economic theory (and constant disregard of the facts).”1 
In a statement issued in February 2008, then U.S. senator Barack 
Obama said that “the current administration has what may be the weakest 
record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half cen-
  
 *  Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Remarks presented at the George Mason Law 
Review Twelfth Annual Symposium on Antitrust, Washington, D.C., Dec. 4, 2008. On Leave: George 
Washington University Law School. From March 31, 2008, to March 1, 2009, the author served as 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. 
        
1
    Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE 
MARK 3, 6 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
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tury.”2 One Obama appointee to the federal antitrust agencies later claimed 
that “inadequate antitrust oversight” contributed to the economic crisis in 
the United States.3 Candidate Obama pledged his administration “to rein-
vigorate antitrust enforcement,”4 a phrase that his supporters repeated fre-
quently in subsequent commentary. 
DOJ provided the chief target for opprobrium. Many commentators 
said, at least in private conversations, that they meant to aim their criticism 
at the Antitrust Division. The results were not so precise. Bush administra-
tion critics may have been trying to hit the DOJ on Tenth and Constitution 
in Washington, D.C., but more than a few blows landed upon the FTC two 
blocks away. Those who professed greater respect for the FTC’s program 
from 2001-2008 rarely summoned more than a reluctant acknowledgment 
that the FTC in some sense acted as it should have.   
Debates about the U.S. federal competition agencies have revealed a 
serious need to return to the basic question of what is good performance. 
Debate about the Bush administration competition program displayed three 
acute problems with modern assessments of the work of the federal agen-
cies. There is strikingly limited knowledge of what the federal agencies 
have done, there is no widely-accepted understanding of what competition 
agencies ought to do, and, even where criteria are expressly identified and 
applied, they tend to be unacceptably incomplete or to equate activity with 
accomplishment.  
A sampling of modern commentary shows the need for better per-
formance standards. Since 2007, the Global Competition Review (“GCR”) 
has published an annual ranking of forty of the world’s competition agen-
cies. To assemble the rankings, the GCR supplements its own examination 
of the agencies’ work with interviews and questionnaires that elicit views of 
practitioners and of the agencies themselves. GCR does not claim scientific 
precision. It tries to provide a rough idea of where the agencies stand.  
The top of the GCR rating system is an “elite five star category.” In 
the ratings for 2007 and 2008, three authorities received the elite five star 
rating: the European Commission’s Competition Directorate, the United 
Kingdom’s Competition Commission (“CC”), and the FTC. In both years, 
DOJ was one rung down with four and one-half stars. For 2009, the five 
star elite institutions were DOJ, the CC, and the FTC. Inclusion in the five-
star category “simply indicates that an authority is at the top of its game.”  
  
 2 Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute (Feb. 20, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/obama2.ashx (follow “Read Senator Obama’s State-
ment on Antitrust here” hyperlink) [hereinafter “Obama Campaign Statement”]. 
 3 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vigorous 
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era 4-5 (May 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf. 
 4 Obama Campaign Statement, supra note 2. 
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From these results, one might conclude that the U.S. federal agencies 
in this decade have performed in a satisfactory manner, if not well above 
average. This is not the perspective of commentators noted above, including 
the current president of the United States. The Obama campaign statement 
contained no suggestion that the Bush administration antitrust agencies 
might be deemed “elite.” Rather, the presidential candidate said the Bush 
administration antitrust enforcement program “may be the weakest” of any 
presidential administration since the late 1950s.5 As indicated above, many 
others offered similarly unflattering assessments. 
Could all of these observers have been talking about the same federal 
agencies? Has the FTC been an “elite five-star” agency, or is it part of the 
weakest antitrust program of the past half-century? Has the Commission 
performed at the top of its game during the Bush administration, or has it 
been dozing under the guidance of leaders whose ideological rigidity in-
duces them to disregard facts constantly? 
The modern commentary about the quality of U.S. competition policy 
begs for answers to two basic questions. First, by what criteria should the 
performance of competition agencies be judged? The lack of widely-
accepted, consistently applied standards for assessing the quality of agency 
performance has afflicted the field of competition policy throughout its 
history, and the absence of such standards is a major impediment today to 
achieving consensus on what competition authorities ought to do. 
Second, once the criteria for the agency report card have been set, how 
should they be applied in order to determine the grades? It is impossible to 
have a constructive conversation about agency performance without a 
common view about how to answer these questions. Without a common 
framework, there is no meaningful way to score agency performance in any 
one period or across time. U.S. competition policy is in serious trouble to-
day if we cannot agree, as then candidate Obama suggested we cannot, that 
federal competition policy in this decade is at least as good as it was, for 
example, in the 1960s. Do commentators sincerely advance the view that 
the FTC of this decade does not surpass the agency of the 1950s and 
1960s—an agency damned by many observers as gravely deficient? 
Why care about the establishment and application of meaningful stan-
dards? Assessments of agency performance are important for several rea-
sons. Agency reputations can be likened to brands, and having a well-
respected brand is an extremely valuable asset. Current perceptions of 
agency quality influence legislative decisions about budgets and additions 
to the agency’s statutory authority, judicial decisions about whether to defer 
to an agency’s positions, judgments by company officials about whether to 
comply with mandates subject to the agency’s supervision, the level of mo-
rale of existing agency employees, and the agency’s success in recruiting 
  
 5 Obama Campaign Statement, supra note 2. 
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new staff. A broadly held view that an agency is fulfilling its duties capably 
also contributes to citizen confidence in public governance and thereby 
strengthens the legitimacy of public administration.   
A great deal of good policy is the result of cumulative, incremental 
improvements over time.6 These improvements progressively enhance the 
agency’s brand. The development of a strong brand is a slow growth that 
requires sustained contributions by agency leadership over time. The char-
acterization of an agency’s work as severely deficient in any one period not 
only can diminish hard-earned reputational capital, but also can induce in-
cumbent leadership to disregard positive developments in an era that incor-
rectly is said to be deficient. If a period of public administration is said to 
be mediocre, new leadership might be inclined to indiscriminately write off 
initiatives pursued in that period and to devise new programs from scratch.  
This presentation discusses the assessment of agency performance in 
two parts. It first discusses what the criteria for evaluating a competition 
agency should be. It then considers how the report card should be applied in 
practice. In setting out the design and application of evaluative criteria, the 
presentation emphasizes investments in achieving superior institutional 
design and enhancing agency capability. These are long-term capital in-
vestments that provide the foundation for the identification and execution of 
successful programs. The returns to such capital investments tend not to be 
appropriable in the one period of any single leader’s tenure, and the U.S. 
system of public administration provides relatively weak incentives for 
incumbent leaders to make them. 
A central theme of this presentation is that the standards for evaluating 
competition agencies should press incumbent leaders to invest substantially 
in activities that improve the capacity of their agencies over the long term. 
Fred Hilmer, whose report in the 1990s led to the reformulation of Austra-
lia’s competition system, makes this point when teaching executive educa-
tion courses for business officials. He tells his students that the good things 
happening in their companies today probably result from investments their 
predecessors made five to ten years ago. He tells his students to ask them-
selves the following: What are you doing today to make sure that your suc-
cessors will prosper five or ten years hence?7 That is the norm that the crite-
ria for evaluation should establish and promote inside a competition 
agency.  
  
 6 On the cumulative, evolutionary nature of policy development in the field of competition law, 
see William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003) [hereinafter “Kovacic, Antitrust Norms”]. 
 7 I am grateful to Professor Hilmer for sharing this point with me. 
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I. SUGGESTED NORMATIVE CRITERIA: THE AGENCY REPORT CARD 
What is good agency performance? The first criterion deals with sub-
stantive results. An agency is performing its duties capably if it improves 
economic performance and social welfare. Among other steps, it does so by 
stimulating improvements in quality, reductions in cost, and increases in 
innovation. 
The second criterion deals with process. Good agency performance 
consists of using superior administrative techniques to achieve good sub-
stantive results and to facilitate improvements in its operations. Among 
other characteristics, good agency process includes the establishment of 
effective internal quality control mechanisms, the adoption of transparency 
and accountability tools to increase public understanding of its activities, 
and a commitment to seek continuing improvements in its operations and in 
its substantive programs. The latter approach abides by the aphorism that it 
is what you learn after you know it all that really counts. “Reinvigoration” 
is not a quadrennial pursuit tied to electoral cycles. A good agency is al-
ways engaged in a process of improvement. 
The emphasis on achieving superior administrative practice assumes 
that good technique ultimately improves substantive results. In golf, the 
logic of hiring a good swing coach is that improving swing technique in-
creases the likelihood that the player will become more proficient in direct-
ing the ball in the desired direction. 
These general criteria can be difficult to apply in practice. This is es-
pecially true of the first. Economic welfare effects of competition policy 
can be difficult to measure directly. It can be hard to trace the immediate 
economic effect of specific matters, much less to gauge the larger impact of 
measures upon the willingness of firms to comply with the law. Moreover, 
the life cycle of a competition policy system may feature a variety of differ-
ent objectives at any one time. Numerous aims motivated the formation of 
the U.S. competition policy system in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.8 Experience over time has revealed tension among goals that 
Congress initially believed to be harmonious. Modern jurisprudence and 
enforcement policy have wrung some of the inconsistency out of this con-
figuration of goals, but the possibility remains for differences in emphasis 
that can yield varied substantive results. 
A further complication is that the U.S. competition policy system is 
deliberately and inherently evolutionary. Congress cast the U.S. statutes in 
relatively open-ended terms with the expectation that judicial interpretation 
and public enforcement would change over time in accord with advances in 
  
 8 This history is summarized in ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN 
A NUTSHELL 23-25 (5th ed. 2004). 
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theory and empirical knowledge.9 What seems to be wisely conceived pol-
icy in one era might be proven to be unwise in a later period. This suggests 
that competition agencies should be given two grades. The first grade de-
pends upon whether the agency’s policies were consistent with the state of 
knowledge at the time. This measure heeds the admonition of Thomas 
McCraw that regulatory policy should be judged by a standard true to the 
time in which policies were adopted. Are the policies of the moment consis-
tent with consensus views about what constitutes good policy?  
Consistency with contemporary views of superior policy should be 
supplemented with a standard that takes a longer term view. Because com-
petition policy is a dynamic field, one also wants to measure the agency’s 
success in any single period in making durable positive contributions to the 
body of competition policy. How good an eye does the agency have to spot 
policies that turn out to be durable and are seen as beneficial? In this sense, 
part of the agency’s grade in any one period is an “incomplete.” The final 
grade is not calculated until years later when commentators assess whether 
earlier measures that were thought at the time to be sensible have remained 
sound in light of developments in learning.  
The conventional report card used to grade competition agencies is not 
so discriminating. The central and most heavily weighted criterion is the 
initiation of new cases. You are whom you sue. This criterion generally 
equates activity with accomplishment.10 By this calculus, total case counts 
and trends in case counts become the measure of an agency’s worth. In this 
framework, there is extra credit for high profile matters. Matters reported 
on the front page of the leading news organizations or at the top of the 
business section receive the heaviest weight.  
The case-driven, activity-oriented calculus suffers from two major 
weaknesses. First, the scoring system accords little credit for smaller cases, 
including the seemingly insignificant matter that makes big law. When the 
Justice Department initiated the case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States11 in 1969, how many observers said the case would transform the 
application of antitrust to traditionally regulated industries and pave the 
way for the government’s monopolization suit against AT&T in the 1970s? 
Most would have said the most important government action in 1969 was 
the filing of the monopolization case against IBM. Otter Tail unexpectedly 
had the greater doctrinal impact and laid a vital foundation for the case 
against AT&T. Otter Tail was the small case that made big law. 
  
 9 See Kovacic, Antitrust Norms, supra note 6, at 400-02 (discussing deliberately evolutionary 
design of U.S. competition regime). 
 10 For example, this is the implicit logic of the Obama Campaign Statement, supra note 2, which 
determines the “strength” or “weakness” of federal antitrust enforcement according to the number of 
cases filed. The same can be said of recent assessments of merger enforcement that equate the quality of 
federal policy with activity levels. 
 11 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
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The second weakness with case-driven activity measures is that they 
ignore non-litigation activities. For example, case-related activity measures 
overlook the significance of the FTC study, To Promote Innovation,12 which 
examined the relationship between the rights granting process and competi-
tion policy. The impact of this study on the development of the intellectual 
property rights granting process in the United States and abroad could 
prove to be as great as any case the FTC has brought in its nearly 100-year 
history. 
A scoring system that focuses on the initiation of cases also can dimin-
ish the incentives of incumbent leadership to invest in activity that facili-
tates the development of better cases in the future. Consider what would 
happen in sports such as basketball, hockey, or soccer if one did not track 
assists. Measurement systems are valuable only if they measure what mat-
ters,13 and a system that overlooks non-litigation policy initiatives misses a 
vital dimension of policy development.  
II. LACK OF CONSENSUS ABOUT WHAT CASES WERE PROSECUTED 
Even if one accepts a case-related activity as the chief index of an 
agency’s worth, there must be shared understanding about past experience. 
There cannot be an informative conversation about the significance of ac-
tivity levels if there is no agreement about what those levels have been. In 
baseball terms, there at least must be common agreement on whether a 
pitch was thrown before moving to a consideration about whether the pitch 
was a ball or a strike.  
The debate associated with Bush administration competition policy 
shows that the competition policy community has a long way to go to 
achieve a common understanding about past experience. U.S. competition 
policy specialists ought to be greatly concerned over the pervasiveness of 
apparent disagreement over what transpired earlier in this decade. Consider 
the example of federal agency civil nonmerger enforcement during the 
Bush administration. At a conference in 2008, Douglas Melamed offered 
this assessment of the Bush administration program: “It’s especially impor-
tant that the agencies engage in the civil nonmerger area where for the most 
part, except for the standard setting and intellectual property settlement 
agenda of the FTC, the agencies have been AWOL.”  
  
 12 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
[hereinafter “FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION”]. 
 13 See William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission and In-
vestments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 861 (2005) (discussing 
importance of establishing correct evaluative criteria). 
910 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 16:4 
It is not evident why the FTC’s cases involving standard setting and 
settlements between producers of branded and generic pharmaceutical 
products would fall into an “except for” category and would not be relevant 
to an examination of the FTC’s nonmerger antitrust enforcement program. 
These matters have considerable economic significance and raise important 
issues of competition policy. No sensible scoring principle would fail to 
treat these enforcement initiatives as noteworthy and important. To exclude 
them makes as much sense as saying that, except for Apollo 11, Neil Arm-
strong never set foot on the moon. 
Even if one casts aside the standards and settlement cases, the proposi-
tion about the intensity of FTC civil nonmerger enforcement in this decade 
is unsupportable. We can test the observation by studying actual levels of 
activity in federal court litigation in the 1990s and in this decade. From the 
1990s to 2000, the FTC had four civil nonmerger matters in the federal 
courts. These are FTC v. Abbott Laboratories,14 California Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC,15 Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC,16 and FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.17 
From 2001 through 2008, the FTC has litigated eight nonmerger matters in 
the federal courts. Four of these involved either standard setting (Rambus 
Inc. v. FTC18) or settlement issues (Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,19 FTC v. 
Cephalon, Inc.,20 and FTC v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co.21). Two matters, 
In re Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Ass’n22 and In re South Carolina 
State Board of Dentistry,23 involved state action questions and yielded court 
of appeals decisions that favored the FTC. The other two, Polygram Hold-
ing, Inc. v. FTC24 and North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC,25 involved 
the structure and application of the rule of reason to horizontal restraints. 
The total of eight FTC nonmerger cases litigated in federal court in 
this decade is twice the number of matters the FTC litigated in federal court 
in the 1990s. The number of cases other than matters involving standards 
and pharmaceutical settlements (four) equals the total number of nonmerger 
matters the FTC litigated in the federal courts in the 1990s. If the FTC that 
has litigated eight nonmerger cases in federal court in this decade can be 
said to have gone “AWOL,” the FTC that litigated four such cases in the 
1990s never enlisted. 
  
 14 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 15 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 16 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 17 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 18 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 19 402 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 20 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 21 No. 1:05-CV-02179-CKK, 2006 WL 3302862 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2006). 
 22 139 F.T.C. 14 (2005). 
 23 No. 9311, 2007 WL 2763994 (F.T.C. Sept. 11, 2007). 
 24 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 25 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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Doug Melamed’s characterization of FTC nonmerger federal court 
litigation since 2001 is not the only sign that the antitrust community is 
wanting for basic agreement about what enforcement took place. In an es-
say published in 2008, Professor Harvey Goldschmid offered the following 
assessment of Bush administration enforcement involving dominant firm 
conduct: “I suspect that Trinko’s dictum and general Chicago School schol-
arship have lulled antitrust agencies and our lower courts into a false sense 
of complacency about dominant firms. Almost nothing is happening in the 
Antitrust Division, at the FTC, or in the courts in the Section 2 area.”26 At a 
bar association event in March 2009, Professor Goldschmid put things still 
more emphatically and dropped the “almost” qualification from his earlier 
essay. Since 2000, he observed, the DOJ and the FTC had done “nothing” 
involving dominant firm conduct in this decade. 
Professor Goldschmid seems to have been referring to the prosecution 
of new cases. If so, his description of the Antitrust Division’s record is cor-
rect. The DOJ has initiated no cases involving monopolization or attempted 
monopolization since 1999. Yet Professor Goldschmid’s characterization of 
the FTC’s record is inexplicable. Since June 2001, the FTC has initiated 
seven cases involving claims that firms used improper means to acquire, 
maintain, or exercise monopoly power. Five cases were premised directly 
on Sherman Act section 2 theories—In re Union Oil Co. (Unocal),27 Ram-
bus Inc. v. FTC,28 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc.,29 In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,30 
and In re Biovail Corp.31 Two others relied exclusively on the prohibition 
against unfair methods of competition found in section 5 of the FTC Act. 
One matter (In re Valassis Communications, Inc.32) involved an invitation 
to collude, and the other (In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC33) con-
cerned allegations that a firm had wrongly exploited monopoly power by 
reneging on licensing commitments made as part of a standard setting proc-
ess. 
The actual pace of FTC activity also comes more clearly into view 
when the current decade is compared to earlier eras. The total of seven new 
cases in eight years (2001-2008) exceeds the FTC’s rate of activity for any 
comparable period since 1969-1976. The FTC during the presidency of 
George W. Bush brought abuse of dominance cases at a faster annual rate 
than either the Carter administration or the Clinton administration. Timothy 
  
 26 Harvey J. Goldschmid, Comment on Herbert Hovenkamp and the Dominant Firm: The Chicago 
School Has Made Us Too Cautious About False Positives and the Use of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 123, 127. 
 27 140 F.T.C. 123 (2005). 
 28 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 29 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 30 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003). 
 31 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002). 
 32 No. C-4160, 2006 WL 1367833, (F.T.C. Apr. 19, 2006). 
 33 No. C-4234, 2006 WL 4407246, (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008). 
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J. Muris, the FTC chairman from June 2001 to August 2004, brought abuse 
of dominance cases at a faster annual rate (four) than Michael Pertschuk 
(three), who chaired the FTC during the Carter administration, and initiated 
a larger total of abuse of dominance cases (four) than Robert Pitofsky 
(three), who served as FTC chairman from April 1995 through March 2001. 
The effort to determine what constitutes a sound competition policy 
program requires a shared understanding of what actually took place. Be-
fore one even gets to an assessment of the quality of activity, there must be 
agreement that there was activity. It is one thing to quarrel over whether a 
thrown pitch ought to be called a ball or a strike. It is another to say that the 
pitcher never delivered the ball toward the plate. The comments examined 
above are akin to saying that the ball in this decade rarely (Melamed) or 
never (Goldschmid) left the pitcher’s hand. 
III. LACK OF CONSENSUS ABOUT WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT 
Some critics of the Bush administration’s antitrust enforcement pro-
gram acknowledge the fact of activity but dismiss it as qualitatively insig-
nificant. Professor Pitofsky offered a representative assessment of this type 
at a conference in 2008, when he said: “The FTC has brought some cases 
that parade under the section 2 label, but these cases are not comparable to 
the cases against Microsoft, Intel, AT&T, Xerox, Kodak.” Here the FTC’s 
initiation of new matters is acknowledged but dismissed as insignificant or 
contrived. Like animals in a circus, the Commission “parades” its inventory 
of dominant firm matters before an audience that presumably knows better 
than to regard them as noteworthy. 
To say that matters are insignificant or unimportant begs for a specifi-
cation of criteria for importance or significance. By what measure are mat-
ters such as Bristol-Myers, Rambus, and Unocal “not comparable” to Mi-
crosoft, Intel, AT&T, Xerox, and Kodak? What is a “major” abuse of domi-
nance case? Professor Pitofsky seems to suggest that a crucial measure is 
the ability of the case to capture news headlines. It is a grim day for compe-
tition law, or public policy generally, if the measure of what an agency does 
is the prominent placement of its matters in the media. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the federal agencies initiated abuse of dominance cases against 
IBM, the four leading producers of breakfast cereal, and the eight leading 
refiners of petroleum products.34 Throughout their lives, these cases at-
tracted lavish coverage from the press. All three matters ended in failure 
and became symbols of poor prosecutorial judgment. By contrast, the filing 
of cases such as Lorain Journal Co. v. United States35 and Otter Tail at-
  
 34 William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the 
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1106-09 (1989). 
 35 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
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tracted little attention at the time of their commencement, yet these cases 
yielded doctrinal results that have influenced the future course of competi-
tion policy. 
There must be standards of significance that are better—much better—
than media attention. Two suitable criteria would be economic impact and 
doctrinal significance. How did the case improve the economic well-being 
of consumers? Did the case address issues important to the development of 
antitrust law? 
We can examine the FTC’s program during the Bush administration in 
light of both criteria. How do the Commission’s abuse of dominance cases 
since 2001 compare to earlier matters in terms of economic effects?36 The 
settlement achieved by the FTC in 2005 in Unocal has been worth ap-
proximately $500 million per year to consumers of gasoline in California. 
That is the most substantial measurable pay-off from an FTC abuse of 
dominance case since Congress established the agency in 1914. Since the 
settlement that resolved the matter in 2003, the Bristol-Myers case has 
yielded at least $3 billion to $5 billion in benefits, and the amount is grow-
ing. Gauged by observable economic effects, Unocal and Bristol-Myers 
belong on the list of the five most important abuse of dominance cases in 
the Commission’s history. 
Doctrinal significance is a separate test of the FTC’s program since 
2001. Three of the FTC’s abuse cases (Negotiated Data Solutions, Rambus, 
Unocal) dealt with the operation of standard setting bodies. Three (Bristol-
Myers, Biovail, Unocal) dealt with misuse of government regulatory proc-
esses. One (Valassis) concerned an invitation to collude, and another dealt 
with the use of patent settlements as instruments of improper exclusion. In 
what sense could these be said to be unimportant matters of antitrust policy 
or doctrine? 
The significance of the doctrinal stakes is perhaps most evident in 
Rambus. In Rambus, the Commission failed to sustain its finding of liabil-
ity, and the Supreme Court declined to take certiorari. In historical context, 
the doctrinal importance of Rambus stands out. Before Rambus, the FTC’s 
most recent appearance before the appellate courts in an abuse case was 
Borden, Inc. v. FTC (ReaLemon)37 in 1982. None of the agency’s abuse of 
dominance cases in the 1990s was litigated to a decision on the merits. All 
settled. The Commission’s remedy in Rambus included compulsory licens-
ing of a patent, and the most recent appellate endorsement of compulsory 
licensing or any other form of structural remedy took place in the 1960s. 
The Commission has never prevailed in an abuse of dominance case before 
  
 36 See William E. Kovacic, The Importance of History to the Design of Competition Policy Strat-
egy: The Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual Property, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 319, 324-26 
(2007). 
 37 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 940 (1983). 
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the Supreme Court. Rambus was not a litigation success for the FTC. But it 
presented doctrinal issues of the highest order. 
The depiction of the FTC’s abuse of dominance program since 2001 as 
either nonexistent (the Goldschmid critique) or substantively insignificant 
(the Pitofsky critique) is more than cheap talk spoken amid an election 
campaign or a presidential transition. It has the capacity to set expectations 
for the FTC leaders who will guide the agency during the Obama admini-
stration. If prominent advisors to the Obama campaign belittle the FTC’s 
program during the Bush administration as null in activity or insignificant 
in substance, what type of program must new management pursue to be 
seen as sufficiently active and influential? What sorts of matters must 
agency managers initiate to surpass the economic results of Unocal or Bris-
tol-Myers, or to exceed the doctrinal content of Polygram or Rambus? If the 
Bush administration matters count for little or “nothing,” there could be a 
perceived imperative for Obama appointees to swing for the enforcement 
equivalent of 800-foot home runs. Striving to achieve visibly superior re-
sults and, dangerously, to get the story on the front page can warp the 
agency’s choice of cases and impose grave long-term costs upon the institu-
tion.    
IV. RARITY OF INTER-TEMPORAL BENCHMARKS AND CASE STUDY 
COMPARISONS 
As the discussion above suggests, assertions about the amount or qual-
ity of activity in any single period invites comparisons. One can claim that a 
given decision to prosecute or not to prosecute was wise or improvident. A 
useful response is to ask: compared to what? Have similar matters been 
treated similarly or differently across administrations? With respect to 
comparable enforcement matters, how did different administrations assess 
the relative risks associated with intervening too vigorously or intervening 
too weakly?  
Merger policy provides a useful context in which to consider the im-
portance of comparisons across time. Enforcement agency decisions con-
cerning proposed mergers often involve difficult predictions about how 
competition will evolve if the merger is allowed to proceed as proposed, 
with or without conditions, or is blocked. In making the predictions associ-
ated with merger control, agencies face two basic types of risks. They im-
providently may forbid a transaction that, if allowed to go forward, would 
improve economic performance, or they may fail to prohibit or amend a 
combination that will damage rivalry with respect to price, quality, or inno-
vation.  
Risks associated with merger review emerge most vividly when an 
agency contemplates approving a transaction in a highly concentrated in-
dustry. In these deals, observers outside the merging parties and the gov-
ernment enforcement agencies can readily see that such transactions will 
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reduce the already small number of industry participants. In the hardest 
cases, the agency confronts arguments—for example, involving diminished 
competitive capability, new entry, or technological change— that weigh 
against reliance on presumptions that ordinarily would shape the disposition 
of say, a three-to-two merger. What the agencies do, and why they do it, in 
these problematic matters is an interesting point of comparison over time. 
In a recent paper that criticizes federal merger policy (especially DOJ 
enforcement) during the Bush administration, Jonathan Baker and Carl 
Shapiro offer the Justice Department’s decision to permit Whirlpool to pur-
chase Maytag as an example of inappropriately permissive merger control.38 
The two scholars conclude that, among other points, DOJ gave too much 
credence to the parties’ arguments about entry and expansion from overseas 
suppliers in deciding to allow the combination to take place. Other com-
mentators have pointed to DOJ’s approval of the XM-Sirius satellite radio 
merger, and its reliance on efficiency justifications, as a further exemplar of 
lax merger oversight.  
The government’s decisions in Maytag-Whirlpool and XM-Sirius in-
volved difficult judgments about entry and efficiency. In some sense, DOJ 
took risks about the soundness of arguments raised to mitigate competitive 
concerns associated with the transactions’ structural features. Were those 
risks excessive? Did Thomas Barnett, the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust and his Antitrust Division colleagues take chances with future 
competition in the affected markets in ways that previous administrations 
would not have contemplated? 
One way to assess the risks taken by DOJ from 2001-2008 is to con-
sider the types of risks the federal agencies took in previous administra-
tions. Informative comparisons can be drawn from examining the FTC’s 
review during the Clinton administration of Boeing’s acquisition of 
McDonnell-Douglas and of various noteworthy mergers, such as Exxon’s 
purchase of Mobil, in the petroleum sector. I preface this discussion by say-
ing I believe the FTC made correct choices in the aerospace and petroleum 
transactions. I was personally involved as a consultant for McDonnell 
Douglas in the Boeing merger, and I thought then, as I do now, that the 
Commission’s conclusions were well reasoned. 
Though I believe the FTC acted wisely, I also view the competitive 
risks taken by the FTC in Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and in many petro-
leum mergers of the 1990s as being at least as grave as the risks that DOJ 
took in Whirlpool-Maytag and XM-Sirius. In Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, 
the consideration that swayed the Commission to approve the deal without 
conditions was McDonnell Douglas’s argument that it had lost the capacity 
to compete effectively for future sales of large commercial aircraft. Consis-
tent with the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in General Dynam-
  
 38 See Jonathon B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1. 
916 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 16:4 
ics, McDonnell Douglas’s share of current sales overstated its competitive 
significance. The merger was not a three-to-two combination; it was two-
to-two, with Airbus and Boeing remaining as the only credible supply 
sources in the eyes of the major customers—the commercial airlines and 
aircraft leasing companies.  
One can spin out an intriguing, plausible counterfactual. If the FTC 
had said no and put the back of McDonnell Douglas to the wall, might the 
company have found a way to survive and ultimately prosper in the com-
mercial aircraft segment of the aerospace market? Perhaps the company 
could have repositioned itself to succeed in what would become the bur-
geoning regional jet market and use this experience base gradually to mi-
grate into larger aircraft designs. Perhaps the Air Force would have deliv-
ered on preliminary suggestions that it would support the development of a 
commercial freighter variant of the C-17 transport—giving McDonnell 
Douglas an important means to continue design and production operations 
for the largest types of commercial airframes. 
Nor was the FTC’s examination of defense-related features of the 
merger free from doubt. For all of its problems in commercial aircraft pro-
duction, McDonnell Douglas remained a formidable designer and producer 
of major weapon systems. In a number of defense-related market segments, 
the merger with Boeing removed McDonnell Douglas as an independent 
center of design, development, and production activity. The Commission 
(and the Department of Defense) chose to downplay concerns associated 
with reduced competition for new weapon systems. These innovation-
related concerns later motivated the Justice Department’s successful effort 
to block Lockheed Martin from buying Northrop Grumman. The dangers to 
defense innovation markets posed by the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
merger arguably were no weaker than the concerns that guided DOJ to stop 
the Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman transaction. 
Last and perhaps most interesting in light of current events was the 
merger’s effect upon the ability of the U.S. Air Force to use competition to 
obtain the next generation of aerial refueling tankers. Boeing’s purchase of 
McDonnell Douglas combined the only two U.S. producers of refueling 
tankers. From a competition policy perspective, the decision to allow the 
transaction to proceed made sense only upon the assumption that, when the 
time came to replace the existing generation of tankers, the Air Force would 
be able to turn to Airbus as a credible alternative to Boeing. That assump-
tion will prove to be unwise if Congress pressures the Department of De-
fense to satisfy its needs from a firm whose headquarters and principal pro-
duction facilities are located in the United States. Maybe Congress eventu-
ally will permit the Department of Defense to award all or part of the re-
placement contracts to Airbus. In light of the powerful protectionist pres-
sures that surround military procurement—especially for big-ticket pro-
grams worth tens of billions of dollars— the FTC took a risky leap of faith. 
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The petroleum mergers of the 1990s provide a second useful view of 
risk-taking during the Clinton administration. In 2004, the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report that studied seven petro-
leum sector mergers reviewed by the FTC from 1995-2000. The report con-
cluded that, notwithstanding remedies obtained by the Commission in some 
transactions, five of the seven mergers resulted in substantial price in-
creases. The GAO found that the Exxon-Mobil merger caused gasoline 
prices on the East Coast to rise by five to seven cents per gallon. Another 
transaction, Unocal’s combination with Tosco, was found to have increased 
gasoline prices in California by five cents per gallon. I do not regard the 
GAO study as sound work, and I have spent many occasions before con-
gressional committees explaining why I believe the FTC’s analysis of the 
mergers in question was sound. One must note, however, that other re-
searchers have raised questions about the results reached by the Commis-
sion in the relevant transactions.  
It is difficult to recount the full sum of opprobrium that legislators 
have visited upon the FTC in this decade as a consequence of the GAO 
study and related commentary. No issue has consumed more attention dur-
ing my time at the FTC in this decade as General Counsel and as a member 
of the Commission. During my interviews with the Senate Commerce 
Committee in 2005 as part of the process to be confirmed as an FTC com-
missioner, one prominent legislator attacked the FTC’s merger enforcement 
record generally and focused particularly on its treatment of petroleum 
mergers in the 1990s. The Senator asserted that the FTC “never stopped 
mergers.” I began to offer the Commission’s famous challenge to the Sta-
ples-Office Depot merger in the agency’s defense. He cut me off and said 
“The Staples case? So you protected my right to buy cheap Post-It notes, 
but you gave away the oil industry. Congratulations.” I know of one in-
stance in which an official who reviewed the controversial petroleum deals 
of the 1990s and mounted a substantial public defense of their decisions 
during debates about energy prices in this decade.39 
When you put your head on the pillow at night and think about the 
risks taken in merger review, what worries you more? The possible loss of 
competition in washing machines and satellite radio, or a possible loss of 
competition in the commercial and defense aerospace sectors and in the 
petroleum industry? Whatever risks Thomas Barnett may have taken in 
Whirlpool-Maytag and XM-Sirius, they are no greater than the risks that 
Robert Pitofsky and his FTC colleagues took in approving Boeing-
McDonnell-Douglas without a scratch or permitting combinations such as 
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Exxon-Mobil, Shell-Texaco, BP-Amoco, and BP-Amoco/Arco, albeit with 
substantial divestitures. 
Recent debates about merger enforcement policy ordinarily do not per-
form this type of comparison of cases across time. Commentators typically 
provide case studies in isolation without considering whether the agency in 
one period took risks that were outside a zone of acceptable practice estab-
lished in earlier periods of public enforcement. This form of inter-temporal 
comparison would supply an important, necessary source of perspective 
about the quality of decision-making in any single era.  
V. UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF ACTIVITY-BASED MEASURES OF 
ACCOMPLISHMENT  
As noted earlier, commentary on U.S. competition policy tends to at-
tach decisive weight to levels of enforcement activity as the measure of the 
worth of the federal competition agencies. Perhaps the most memorable 
example of this approach is the Obama campaign statement that “the Bush 
administration may have the weakest enforcement program in the past half 
century.”40 This deplorable slogan assumes that activity levels are the ap-
propriate benchmark of policy quality. As used in the statement, “weakest” 
means fewest cases. 
Taken on its own terms, the Obama statement is unsupportable, al-
though the candidate provided no table of cases that would permit a more 
confident testing of his claims. If case counts are the measure of agency 
effectiveness, then the Bush administration program surpasses activity rates 
of previous administrations in a number of key areas. Enforcement matters 
can be grouped in six categories: criminal prosecution of cartels, civil hori-
zontal restraints, distribution practices (including challenges to vertical 
agreements and Robinson-Patman violations), mergers, abuse of domi-
nance, and challenges doctrines or statements that immunize behavior as a 
result of state involvement. The Obama statement contains no supporting 
tables of cases, and it is not apparent that the candidate’s advisors under-
took the laborious process of examining case filings by year going back to 
the late 1950s and further traced changes in activity levels by category of 
enforcement activity. The “may be the weakest” hedging in the Obama 
statement is a certifying indication that hunch and intuition were no less 
important than data in preparing the conclusions. 
A quick survey of studies that have undertaken the laborious task of 
counting and classifying cases over the past fifty years underscores the frail 
factual basis for the Obama statement’s claim of ineffectiveness.41 For ex-
ample, the DOJ’s criminal enforcement program against cartels in this dec-
  
 40 Obama Campaign Statement, supra note 2. 
 41 Kovacic, Antitrust Norms, supra note 6. 
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ade dwarfs, in number of cases, the Antitrust Division’s program in the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The combined DOJ/FTC output of abuse of 
dominance cases in this decade exceeds the output of the Reagan Admini-
stration. The total DOJ/FTC output of civil horizontal restraints matters in 
this decade surpasses the government’s output of such cases in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s. Immunity and exemption cases filed in this decade match 
or exceed levels from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1990s. A more detailed exami-
nation would identify other examples of how a cases-count-for-everything 
measure places the Bush administration higher on the ladder of activity than 
its predecessors in key areas of activity. 
More fundamentally, there are good reasons to reject the Obama 
statement’s suggestion that case counts are the best way to measure the 
strength or weakness of an antitrust program. One of the most important 
reasons to distrust measures of effectiveness that rest solely on case counts 
is that views of what constitutes good policy change over time. Owing to its 
grounding in industrial organization economics, competition law is inher-
ently evolutionary. That is why a properly designed report card marks per-
formance with two grades. One grade measures the agency’s work by con-
temporary standards. The second grade assesses the agency’s contribution, 
in any one period, of policies, doctrinal developments, or analytical con-
cepts that prove to be durable and respected over the long term. The second 
grade inevitably typically gets filled in only after extensive experience with 
a contribution provided during a specific period. 
Because the development of a competition system is cumulative and 
evolutionary, “good policy” in any one period may consist of taking differ-
ent measures in light of trends in the state of current knowledge concerning 
theory and empirical study. The design of law enforcement programs illus-
trates the point. Good policy sometimes consists of backing away from ex-
isting enforcement frontiers, sometimes pushing enforcement outward, and 
sometimes sustaining the status quo. A characteristic of good practice is 
than an agency regularly rethinks what it is doing and considers adjust-
ments that expand or contract enforcement with respect to specific prac-
tices.  
Another difficulty with relying upon a case-centric report card is the 
temptation it creates for enforcement officials to focus on inputs rather than 
outcomes. A norm that emphasizes the initiation of matters—especially 
headline grabbing cases—deflects needed attention away from the actual 
economic effects of each matter. This is akin to measuring the effectiveness 
of commercial airlines solely by the number of departures. Imagine going to 
an airport and seeing a series of screens, all of which are labeled “Depar-
tures.” When the passengers ask about arrivals, the airlines reply that they 
do not track those events. Nobody runs a commercial airline company in 
this manner. For competition policy, we should be concerned not only with 
how many cases an agency launches, but also with where and how they 
come to earth. 
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Case centrism also has the adverse effect of leading an agency to ig-
nore investments in valuable non-litigation activities. Successful competi-
tion authorities employ a wide range of policy instruments that include, but 
are not limited to, the prosecution of cases. These include advocacy before 
other public agencies, the preparation of reports, outlays for competition 
policy research and development that increase agency capability, and the 
creation of interagency networks that strengthen the infrastructure of poli-
cymaking within and across jurisdictions. 
One reason to invest in non-litigation work is to ensure that the agency 
is attuned to changes in the state of the art of industrial organization knowl-
edge that dictate adjustments in its mix of enforcement initiatives. The field 
of distribution practices shows what can happen when an agency is not re-
flecting upon its work in light of new knowledge. In the 1960s, for exam-
ple, the FTC made huge commitments to Robinson-Patman Act enforce-
ment without a research agenda or program of public consultation that may 
have pointed to a reallocation of antitrust resources. It took an exogenous 
shock—mainly in the form of critical commentaries by outside observers—
to induce the Commission to rethink its enforcement priorities. Similarly, 
the Commission did not consider, in the years following cases such as 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.42 and Albrecht v. Herald Co.43 in 
the late 1960s, whether categorical condemnation of various price and non-
price restraints took proper account of an emerging literature that called for 
a more discriminating assessment of the conduct at issue. Here, also, the 
force for change was an exogenous shock (the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.44 in 1977) that caused the 
Commission to adjust its enforcement program, not an internally generated 
program of research or analysis. The FTC followed policy developments 
and did not lead them. 
Non-litigation programs also can provide superior policy solutions to 
problems that an agency otherwise might chose to address through law en-
forcement. The FTC’s report, To Promote Innovation,45 makes the point. 
Published in 2003 after extensive public hearings conducted by the DOJ 
and the Commission, the FTC report suggested how improvements in the 
processes for granting patent rights could help realize important competi-
tion policy goals. Among other observations, the Report recognized that 
antitrust litigation sometimes sought to address problems arising from a 
failure of rights granting authorities to apply criteria of patentability in a 
rigorous manner. Enforcement agencies and courts would use antitrust doc-
trine to correct, in a rough second-best manner, improvident grants of pat-
ent rights. The To Promote Innovation proceedings and Report recom-
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 43 390 U.S. 145, 147 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997). 
 44 433 U.S 36 (1977). 
 45 FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 12. 
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mended a first best solution in the form of patent reform measures that 
would address the problem at its source. The report has influenced the 
thinking of the Supreme Court on patent issues and has inspired a global re-
examination of the links between these two areas of activity. 
The preparation of the Report and the proceedings on which it rested 
required a major investment of the FTC’s best resources. This type of in-
vestment does not appear in the box score of competition agency work if 
law enforcement is the only activity recorded. Non-litigation initiatives 
should viewed as proper elements of the solution set. In some instances, 
they are compliments to litigation. In others, they are substitutes. Non-
litigation matters involve what may be seen, ex ante, as indeterminate re-
turns, but no more so than many litigation matters. The FTC’s report on 
internet sales of wine, published in 2004, is an example. There was no 
guarantee that it would motivate courts or legislators to reexamine restric-
tions on interstate sales of wine via the internet. Yet the Supreme Court 
took careful account of the report in writing its opinion in Granholm v. 
Heald46 and cited the report more than twenty times. The report provided a 
major basis for the Court’s view that the justification asserted by the states 
to support restrictions on internet sales matched poorly with the protective 
measures the states had adopted. The FTC report was integral to the Court’s 
conclusion that the state restrictions transgressed the Commerce Clause. As 
such, the FTC report indirectly achieved the results that the agency might 
have pursued by bringing its own case. 
To this point, the discussion of effectiveness criteria has focused on 
what the competition agency does in its own capacity. It is increasingly 
apparent that competition agencies, acting alone, cannot fulfill their respon-
sibilities adequately. Cooperation through networks of authorities within 
and across jurisdictions will be necessary to formulate and execute effective 
competition policies. A case-centric evaluation metric accords no credit to 
an agency’s efforts to build an infrastructure of relationships among 
authorities with related responsibilities inside a single jurisdiction or to 
form links to public institutions in other countries. If agency leaders see that 
cases are all that count, there will be few incentives to make what are essen-
tially long-term capital investments in the infrastructure of cooperative rela-
tionships. 
An important example involves modern efforts by the DOJ and FTC to 
develop networks for more effective cooperation with agencies outside the 
United States. Among other initiatives, the U.S. agencies played a forma-
tive role in the creation of the International Competition Network (“ICN”) 
in October 2001 and have dedicated substantial resources to its substantive 
programs and operational management. Building this network or establish-
ing other mechanisms for international cooperation cannot be done on the 
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cheap. An agency must put its best people in the field to do this well: there 
is no room for children or rookies. Nor is it enough to have keen technical 
skills and experience. To command respect and make positive contribu-
tions, an agency’s representatives must have good judgment. An essential 
element of the requisite judgment is to know the correct time, place, and 
manner to speak.  
The ICN thrives today only because a number of its members have 
made the necessary capital investment whose returns will occur largely 
after the terms of those who founded the network have come to an end. The 
FTC’s work is illustrative. Randy Tritell’s work on merger process reforms 
in the ICN’s first years provided the policy equivalent of a movie block-
buster that a studio needs to thrive and to obtain the funds to produce 
smaller “indie” films that have less immediate audience appeal but also 
improve the state of the art. The FTC also was instrumental in leading the 
committee that raised funds to enable members from less affluent countries 
to attend meetings. Where would the ICN be today without those and simi-
lar investments? We would have passed the fifth anniversary of its demise. 
It flourishes today only because of capital investments that a case-centric 
effectiveness metric ignores. 
This highlights the chief vice of a case-centric evaluation system. It 
accords no credit to long-term capital investments. It gives decisive weight 
to the initiation of new cases. This incentive system can warp the judgment 
of incumbent political appointees who typically serve terms of only a few 
years. The perceived imperative to create new cases can create a serious 
mismatch between commitments and capabilities, as the sirens of credit-
claiming beckon today’s manager to overlook the costs that improvident 
case selection might impose on the agency in the future, well after the in-
cumbent manager has departed. It is a common aphorism in Washington 
that agency leaders should begin by picking the low-hanging fruit. One has 
an image of gangs of fruit gatherers with baskets roaming about the Mall in 
search of the accessible fruit. What is missing in the lexicon of Washington 
policymaking is an exhortation to plant the trees that, in future years, yield 
the fruit.  
Investments in knowledge have long-term capital qualities. Invest-
ments in activities—research, workshops, partnerships with academia—that 
build knowledge help ensure that the agency stays abreast of important de-
velopments in economic theory, empirical study, and legal analysis. Among 
other applications, this knowledge-building is a crucial element of effective 
case selection. A superior knowledge base increases the agency’s ability to 
attempt more complex and demanding matters, helps the agency ground its 
cases in the best possible conceptual and empirical foundations, and pro-
vides assurance that the agency will not find itself trapped in the wrong 
analytical model. 
The FTC’s experience with dominant firm behavior in the 1970s 
shows what happens when this type of investment is lacking. In that decade 
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the FTC brought a striking collection of cases predicated on theories of 
attempted monopolization, monopolization, and shared dominance. Com-
mentators often depict this program of FTC enforcement as being almost 
irrational in its tendency to overlook sound contemporary views of good 
policy. This interpretation overlooks the most serious avoidable errors of 
policymaking. The Commission’s dominance cases were grounded in 
widely-accepted economic theories, but modern developments in theory 
and empirical research had begun to raise serious doubts about these theo-
ries. The intellectual framework was changing, and the Commission missed 
the adjustment. Not only did it sustain existing matters, it commenced new 
cases based on the same ideas. 
The second avoidable error was a failure to match commitments to 
agency capabilities. One could understand a decision to bring one innovat-
ing and potentially pathbreaking shared monopolization case, but it was 
improvident to bring two. One could imagine a decision to bring one or two 
predatory pricing cases, but it overtaxed the agency’s capacity to do three at 
once. To do four significant dominance cases at one time might have been 
manageable. To do eight was unwise. Incumbent leadership began new 
matters without asking difficult questions about how the agency would 
bring them to a successful end. Departures counted for everything, and arri-
vals were an afterthought. 
VI. TOWARD A SUPERIOR EFFECTIVENESS REPORT CARD 
In 2008, the FTC conducted a self-study to identify what the agency 
must do to fulfill the role that Congress assigned it in 1914. The exercise, 
The FTC at 100,47 focused on steps the agency should take to ensure that, 
by the time of Commission’s centenary in 2014, the FTC comes as close as 
possible to realizing the vision that motivated its creation. The self-study 
supplied a number of useful insights about what constitutes good agency 
performance. Here is a summary of the effectiveness criteria that the self-
study would place on the report card for a competition agency.  
First, how clearly and coherently has the agency stated its objectives? 
Everything an agency does flows from how it defines its purposes and ob-
jectives. A clear statement of aims is essential to guide the agency’s own 
personnel and to permit outsiders to understand and debate the institution’s 
choice of goals. 
Second, does the agency have a conscious process for setting a strat-
egy and selecting programs that will fulfill its stated goals? There can be a 
tendency for agencies to choose new projects based on past patterns of be-
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havior alone, or simply in response to demands by other government insti-
tutions.  
Third, does the agency have a problem-solving orientation? This ori-
entation looks to a broad and flexible array of policy tools to address prob-
lems. Litigation is one important dimension of policymaking, but it is not 
the exclusive focus of attention. The agency should be judged by its capac-
ity to select the correct policy tool or combination of tools. 
Fourth, is the agency making adequate investments in acquiring and 
retaining the human capital it needs to perform its chosen projects? It is 
impossible to decide what compositions an orchestra should perform with-
out accounting for the skills of the players. So it is for competition policy. 
Fifth, is the agency making regular, substantial investments to improve 
its base of knowledge? An agency’s proficiency is closely tied to its knowl-
edge of economic phenomena and its command of the state of the art in 
economic theory and legal analysis. Each budget cycle must include a sig-
nificant component for the policy research and development that makes the 
agency smarter. 
Sixth, has the agency developed internal quality control procedures to 
ensure that theories and facts are tested rigorously before cases are initi-
ated? 
Seventh, is the agency making capital investments in the infrastructure 
of inter-agency networks, within its own jurisdiction and across borders, 
which build a framework of effective cooperation?  
Eighth, does the agency have a mechanism for regularly evaluating the 
effects of its programs and processes? Is there a conscious, routine process 
for measuring performance and making adjustments based on what evalua-
tion exercises have revealed? The point of policymaking is to deliver good 
outcomes for society. Good performance does not consist of achieving 
higher levels of activity but instead consists of delivering good results. 
Measuring program effectiveness is not an easy undertaking, but to say that 
it is difficult is not a good reason to ask outsiders to accept effectiveness as 
a matter of faith. Meaningful evaluation by agency insiders and outsiders 
requires the competition authority to take steps to reveal useful information 
about its work. This includes disclosing good data sets about its past activ-
ity. An important focus of the FTC’s work in this decade has been to pro-
duce and disclose data sets on its merger enforcement work and to increase 
the frequency in which it provides explanations about decisions not to 
prosecute following an extensive investigation. 
CONCLUSION  
What is a good competition agency? Good performance has two di-
mensions. One focuses on the output of initiatives—litigation and non-
litigation activities—that improve economic performance. The second in-
volves capital investments in long-term capability. Incumbent managers 
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should be graded on both dimensions. A major responsibility for incumbent 
leadership is to maximize positive externalities for the agency in the future. 
Means to this end include long-term capital investments in agency capacity, 
a continuous process of self-assessment, and a research agenda that asks 
how things are turning out. The aim is a continuous pursuit of better prac-
tices.  
The focus on institution-building stems from the recognition that the 
establishment of successful policy over time is substantially a cumulative, 
incremental process. The discourse about competition law during the recent 
presidential campaign and in the run-up to President Obama’s inauguration 
showed little awareness of this ingredient of institution-building and agency 
effectiveness. There appeared to be a perceived imperative to depict poli-
cymaking in this decade as contributing little if anything to the develop-
ment of sound competition programs and institutions. The candidate and his 
supporters could not speak of making improvements to competition policy. 
Instead, it was said to be necessary to “reinvigorate” antitrust enforce-
ment—a clear suggestion that it was sterile. 
The danger in this vocabulary is how it sets expectations for new lead-
ership. Echoing the Obama campaign themes, two commentators recom-
mended that the FTC “should reinvigorate its approach, its enforcement 
agenda and empirical research to target any competitive conduct in key 
economic sectors such as health care, energy and technology.”48 The same 
commentators said it was time for the Commission to reinvigorate horizon-
tal merger enforcement. How might one reinvigorate an FTC health care 
program that, in this decade, included noteworthy merger and nonmerger 
cases involving hospitals, physicians, and pharmaceutical companies? If the 
FTC’s program of recent years is not vigorous, what would be? And what 
can we expect will go beyond the bounds of an energy program that has 
featured extensive merger and nonmerger cases, as well as extensive studies 
and a major rulemaking initiative? Not to mention technology-intensive 
cases such as Rambus and Negotiated Data Solutions and non-litigation 
projects such as the FTC’s Report To Promote Innovation. Or to extend a 
merger enforcement program that featured a number of preliminary injunc-
tion actions in 2008 alone—a higher rate of activity than in any year since 
the modern merger review system was established in the 1970s—and elic-
ited expansive judicial interpretations of the FTC’s powers to block deals in 
federal district court. Is the FTC expected to go beyond what it achieved in 
FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.49 and later in FTC v. CCC Holdings, 
Inc.?50 
  
 48 See Joan Z. Bernstein & Ann Malester, Federal Trade Commission: Consumer Protection and 
Competition for a 21st-Century Economy, in CHANGE FOR AMERICA 413, 413-14 (Mark Green & Mich-
ele Jolin eds., 2009). 
 49 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 50 No. 08-2043 (RMC), 2009 WL 774348 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2009). 
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This program usefully can undergo adjustments, refinements, and im-
provements. The same can be said of any program in any period. It does not 
demand “reinvigoration,” yet that is the demand that so many commenta-
tors have made. This tells new leadership that they will have failed unless 
they go dramatically beyond an FTC agenda that, by historical and contem-
porary measures, has been ambitious. It is one thing to exhort leaders to 
turn singles into doubles and doubles into triples. It is another to demand 
the equivalent of 800-foot home runs. Striving to do so generates lots of 
pop-ups, strike-outs, and double play balls and it is really hard to hit the ball 
that far. 
In the first years of this decade, Timothy Muris and Robert Pitofsky 
identified the substantial common ground that linked their chairmanships of 
the FTC.51 That dialogue promised to reinforce progression toward a dura-
ble consensus on what constitutes good policy. It featured an emphasis on 
litigation and non-litigation initiatives alike and underscored the importance 
of investments in institution building. The commentary so often featured in 
the 2008 presidential campaign will not achieve that end. 
 
  
 51 More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools—A Conversation with Tim Muris and 
Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005). 
